Tippee Liability Under Rule 10B-5 Predicated on Whether Tipper Tips to Secure Personal Benefit, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) by Menghini, Matthew D.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 1 
January 1984 
Tippee Liability Under Rule 10B-5 Predicated on Whether Tipper 
Tips to Secure Personal Benefit, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 
(1983) 
Matthew D. Menghini 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew D. Menghini, Tippee Liability Under Rule 10B-5 Predicated on Whether Tipper Tips to Secure 
Personal Benefit, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 165 (1984). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss1/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
TIPPEE LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10B-5 PREDICATED ON WHETHER
TIPPER TIPS TO SECURE PERSONAL BENEFIT
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983)
Raymond Dirks, an investment analyst, received inside information
relating to massive fraud in the internal operations of Equity Funding
Corporation of America (EFCA).1 Dirks alerted several of his institu-
tional clients, 2 which thereafter liquidated a substantial portion of their
EFCA holdings, causing a precipitous decline in the stock's value.3
An SEC investigation of Dirks' activities culminated in a hearing
before an administrative law judge, who found Dirks guilty of aiding
and abetting violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws,4 including section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 5 section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 and SEC rule lOb-5.7
1. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983). The "tipper," Ronald Secrist, was a former
officer of Equity Funding Corporation of America (EFCA). After various regulatory agencies
failed to act on allegations that EFCA's assets were vastly overstated, Secrist revealed the fraudu-
lent scheme to Dirks. He hoped that Dirks, an investment analyst, would verify the fraud in the
course of his normal investigatory procedures and expose it to the public. Id
2. Id Dirks' clients liquidated at least $16 million worth of EFCA stock.
3. Id at 3258-59. When a deluge of "sell" orders hit the market, EFCA's stock fell from $25
per share to less than $15 per share. As a result of this drop, the New York Stock Exchange halted
trading of EFCA stock. Immediately following the halt, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and California insurance authorities launched a full-scale investigation of EFCA which
finally exposed the fraud. Id This scenario corresponded exactly with Secrist's wishes. Id at
3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. In re Boston Co. Inst'l Investors, Inc., 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,705, at 80,816
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The administrative law judge suspended Dirks from association with any regis-
tered broker for sixty days and censured four institutions Which had traded large blocks of EFCA
stock after receiving tips from Dirks. Id at 80,867.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). Section 17(a) prohibits fraud, misrepresentations or material
omissions in the offer or sale of any security.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). Rule lob-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
2) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
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On appeal, the SEC reduced Dirks' sanction to censure,8 and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.9 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals, and held: The duty of a tippee to disclose or abstain from
trading on inside information derives from the fiduciary duty the in-
sider-tipper owes the corporation's shareholders.'" If the insider's pur-
pose for tipping is not to secure a personal gain, he does not breach his
fiduciary duty and the tippee does not breach his derivative duty by
trading."
An insider standing in a fiduciary relationship with corporate share-
holders must disclose all material, nonpublic information before he can
trade on inside information.' 2 This affirmative duty to disclose or re-
frain from trading has its origin in the common law tort of deceit.' 3
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Id
8. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9. Id at 846. Judge Skelly Wright, in an opinion expressing his own reasoning, asserted
that Dirks, as a tippee, acquired the same fiduciary obligation Secrist owed EFCA shareholders as
a corporate insider: publicly to disclose inside information before trading or to abstain from trad-
ing altogether. Id at 839. Alternatively, Judge Wright concluded that Dirks "had obligations to
the SEC and to the public completely independent of any obligations he acquired under the Sha-
piro v. Merrill Lynch doctrine." Id at 840. The Supreme Court declined to consider this alternate
approach, determining that this rationale was not properly before the Court. 103 S. Ct. at 3267
n.26. For a discussion of Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974), see infra note 35.
10. 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3264 (1983).
11. Id at 3265-66. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
12. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). This statement represents the mod-
em elaboration of an insider's fiduciary duty to corporate shareholders. See generally Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1, 1-11
(1982) (discussing the evolution of an insider's duty from its common law origins to the present).
13. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362 (1903);
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186
N.E. 659 (1933). See infra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. See also Langevoort, supra note
12, at 4 (discussion of the common law deceit action in the context of insider trading); Note, Rule
lob-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. Rev.
866, 872 (1979) (same) [hereinafter cited as Note, Market Insiders]; Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty
to Disclose Market Information: It Takes a Thief, 55 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 93, 96 (1980) (same)
[hereinafter cited as Note, It Takes a ThieI; Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L.
Rv. 537, 546 (1956) (same) [hereinafter cited as Note, Civil Liability].
In order to recover at common law in a deceit action, a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant
misrepresented a material fact with the intent to induce plaintiff's reliance thereon, and that the
plaintiff in fact relied on the misrepresentation to his detriment. The common law standard re-
quires that inside information be both materialand nonpublic. The Supreme Court has suggested
that information is material if "the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
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Although the common law deceit action clearly provided a remedy
for the victims of active misrepresentation, courts disagreed on the
question whether a corporate insider could be held liable for failure to
disclose material, nonpublic information to individual shareholders. 4
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 1980) (corporate director's casual comments not material); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-52 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(non-disclosure of discovery of rich ore deposits held material information); Pachter v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 F. Supp. 417, 422 (E.D.N.Y.), ayf'd 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1978) (broker's knowledge of rumors not concrete enough to constitute material information);
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971) (non-disclosure of drop in corporate earn-
ings held material information). See generally Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322, 323 (1976) (noting outer
boundaries of material, nonpublic information); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quirt into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 803-04 (1973)
(discussing possible distinction between information material to short-term and long-term inves-
tors).
Modern courts refer to the defendant's intent requirement as "scienter." Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). Proof of scienter is a
requisite element of a rule lob-5 action. 425 U.S. at 197. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the
Supreme Court held that the word "manipulative" within rule lOb-5 suggests that a defendant
must act with a culpable intent greater than "negligence" in order to meet rule lOb-5's scienter
requirement. Id at 199. The Court, however, left open the question of whether "recklessness" is
sufficient to constitute scienter. Id at 207-09. Lower courts have uniformly held that the scienter
requirement is satisfied upon a showing of "reckless conduct." See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander,
599 F2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,44-47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
Plaintiffs need not always provide proof of actual reliance on defendants' material misrepresen-
tations. Courts recognize that a showing of actual reliance is impractical, if not impossible, in
contemporary impersonal markets such as the stock exchange. Thus, courts hold that when a
defendantfails to disclose material nonpublic information prior to trading, a modern rule lob-5
action requires only a showing that the defendant's misrepresentation is one on which the reason-
able investor would have relied. Affiliated Ute Citizens V'. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
For a discussion of the application of rule lOb-5 in an impersonal market, see infra notes 19-26
and accompanying text. When a defendant actively misrepresents material facts courts may still
require a plaintiff to prove actual reliance as a prerequisite to lOb-5 recovery. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981). afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 692 (1983).
14. Three schools of thought developed. The majority of courts concluded that corporate
officials owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders collectively, but owe no such duty to their
shareholders individually. See, e.g., Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905);
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6
P.2d 373 (1931). Thus, corporate officials were under no obligation to disclose material facts to a
stockholder before trading on insider information. One rationale frequently advanced to support
this rule was the fear that placing an "onerous" level of fiduciary duty on corporate directors and
officers would deter qualified individuals from accepting office. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283
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The enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,15 (the 1933 and 1934 Acts), and the promulgation
of rule lOb-516 established the current framework for the governance of
insider trading.' 7 While rule lob-5 does not explicitly purport to define
Mass. 358, 361, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). Courts adopting the majority rule, however, recognized
the unfairness involved when a corporate insider possessing nonpublic information actively
sought a shareholder with whom to trade, knowing that the shareholder was not privy to inside
information. Id at 362, 186 N.E. at 661.
A minority of courts held that the fiduciary duty of corporate officials to the corporate entity
extended to the shareholders as well, and therefore imposed an affirmative duty on corporate
officials to disclose to stockholders all material nonpublic information relating to their shares or
abstain from trading. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Board of
Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157
N.W. 929 (1916); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
In Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
majority view, asserting that the fact that a director owed a fiduciary duty to the corporate entity
"is not to be perverted into a holding that he is under no obligation" to the shareholders individu-
ally. Id The court asserted that because corporate officers hold a position of the highest trust and
confidence, they stand in a quasi-trustee relationship to individual shareholders. Id It is im-
proper, therefore, for officers to take advantage of special nonpublic information to the detriment
of the shareholders. Id at 368, 45 S.E. at 234. The court concluded that nondisclosure is fraudu-
lent if the insider "purposefully conceals" material information and uses it to his own advantage.
Id Courts today interpret rule lob-5 as a codification of this position. See infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
The Supreme Court articulated a third approach in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In
Strong, the director of a corporation that owned substantial tracts of land in the Philippines
secretly sold some of the corporation's land to the United States. Id at 432. Before the announce-
ment of the sale, which caused the stock to triple in value, the director, acting through a third
party broker to conceal his identity, bought shares of the corporation's stock from the plaintiff. Id
at 432-33. The Court held that the director had an affirmative duty to disclose all material facts
prior to trading due to the "special facts" of the case, which included his position as director and
his knowledge of the significant land sale transaction. Id at 431.
For subsequent cases invoking the "special facts doctrine," see Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371,
381-82, 159 P.2d 224, 228 (1945); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 157-58, 63 N.E.2d 630,
632 (1945); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 508, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925). See also Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("special facts" doctrine so
broad it is in essence adoption of the minority rule). For a full discussion of Chiarella, see ittfra
notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). Congress enacted the 1933
and 1934 Acts in response to proof of widespread abuses in the securities markets. See S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 163-220 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934). See
generally Brudney, supra note 13, at 330-31 (discussing evidence of securities abuses contained in
the legislative history of the 1934 Act).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1982). For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see supra note 7.
17. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 2. Neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 expressly pro-
hibits insider trading. See supra notes 6 & 7. In fact, Congress regulated insider trading in only
one instance. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982),
provides for recovery of short-term profits earned by certain insideis buying and selling the same
securities within a six-month period. Because section 16(b) is designed merely to prevent desig-
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an insider's duty of disclosure, courts initially interpreted its broad,
anti-fraud language to include codification of the common law tort of
deceit.' 8 Courts were uncertain, however, whether lOb-5 extended to
impersonal transactions, such as those occurring on the stock exchange,
where reliance is difficult to prove.' 9
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) resolved this ques-
tion in Cady, Roberts & Co. ,2 holding that rule 1Ob-5 prohibited a bro-
ker, who had inadvertently received inside information from a
corporate director,2" from trading shares of the corporation on the
stock exchange.22
Concluding that the broker's actions violated rule lOb-5, notwith-
standing that he was not an insider,23 the SEC established that rule
lOb-5 prohibited impersonal transactions of tippees.24 The SEC estab-
hated insiders from recovering short-term profits and not to prevent fraudulent conduct, it is inef-
fective against most insider trading abuses. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 3 n.7.
18. Eg., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modfied, 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). See also Note,
Market Insiders, supra note 13, at 877; Note, It Takes a Thief, supra note 13, at 102-04; Note, Civil
Liabiliv; supra note 13, at 554-56. See generally Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437
(2d Cir. 1943) (discussion of the Securities Acts' relationship to the common law views of the duty
to disclose).
19. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
20. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
21. In Cady, Roberts, a director of the Curtiss-Wright corporation, believing that the infor-
mation was public, tipped a broker that Curtiss-Wright's board recently voted to cut its dividend.
Id at 909. The broker immediately traded on the basis of this information, successfully disposing
of several hundred shares of Curtiss-Wright stock before the corporation publicly announced the
dividend cut and the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading. Id at 909-10.
22. Id at 914 (asserting that a contrary decision would be "anomalous"). See also
Langevoort, supra note 12, at 8. The SEC also rejected an assertion that the defendant lacked a
fiduciary duty because his transaction did not involve a purchase from existing shareholders, but
rather sales to non-shareholders. 40 S.E.C. at 913-14 & n.23.
23. The broker was merely a tippee trading on inside information. The SEC stated, however,
that traditional insiders such as corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders "do not
exhaust the classes" of individuals subject to rule lOb-5. Id at 912. See infra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text,
24. Commentators disagree over whether there should be rules governing insider trading at
all. The expansion of rule lob-5 to encompass the regulation of insider trading on impersonal
markets sparked considerable controversy. See Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks:
"Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw 517, 520-27 (1982); Manne, In Defense of Insider
Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REv. 113, 116-18 (Nov.-Dec. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Marne, Insider
Trading]; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professor, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970)
thereinafter cited as Manne, Law Professo]. See also Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evdentiary Privileges, and the Production ofInformation, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309; Scott, Insider
Trading." Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980); Wu, An
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fished a two-part test to identify those subject to liability under lOb-5
for trading on nonpublic information. First, the individual must have
access to corporate information not intended to accrue to anyone's ben-
efit.2" Second, there must exist the inherent unfairness involved when
such a person trades with others knowing they do not have access to the
same information. 2
6
The Second Circuit further expanded the scope of rule lob-5 in SEC
Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260
(1968).
25. 40 S.E.C. at 912. The SEC stated that its objective was to "identify those persons who are
in a special relationship with a corporation and privy to its internal affairs. . . ." Id
The "special relationship" requirement can be read broadly to imply that fraud might be estab-
lished absent a fiduciary relationship on the part of the trader. The Second Circuit gave credence
to such an expansive view in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), when it stated that trading on the mere "possession" of inside infor-
mation was sufficient to constitute a violation of rule lob-5. Id at 848. The Supreme Court in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), overruled the "mere possession" rule, stating that
there is no lob-5 violation absent a fiduciary duty to disclose. See infra notes 30-35 and accompa-
nying text.
26. 40 S.E.C. at 912. This second prong is aimed at preventing shareholder harm. The SEC
stated that the insider's "relationship to his customers was such that he would have a duty not to
take a position adverse to them, not to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts
to them, and in general to place their interests ahead of his own." Id at 916 n.3 1.
The SEC was not advocating equal information among traders. The SEC expressed concern
not for the unfairness which results when parties possessing different degrees of information trade,
but for that which results from one party having access to information which the other party could
not lawfully reach prior to its public disclosure. The SEC stressed that it is inherently unfair for a
person to take "advantage of [inside] information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing." Id (emphasis added). There is judicial support for the equal access theory; arguably
its roots lie firmly in the legislative history of the securities laws. Eg., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[t]he core of rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the
congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in
securities transactions."), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For a comprehensive discussion of the
justification for the equal access theory, see Brudney, supra note 13, at 339-47, 353-67.
The equal access theory should not be confused with the "equal information" theory, which
requires that all investors actually have the same information before trading. Commentators sug-
gest that regulations requiring equal information would be impossible to enforce. See Brudney,
supra note 13, at 354-55 (distinguishing the equal access theory from the equal information the-
ory). At one time the SEC appeared to support an equal information theory. See Faberge, Inc.,
45 S.E.C. 249, 254 (1973). For commentary in support of the equal information theory, see gener-
ally W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURES (1979);
Kaplan, Wolf v. Weinstein: Another Chapter on Insider Trading, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 273; Loss,
The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 33 MOD.
L. REV. 34 (1970); Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recod#flcation Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 699
(1971); Schotland, Unsafe at any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
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v. Texas GrulfSulphur Co. ,27 holding that any person possessing mate-
rial inside information has a duty to disclose it or refrain from trading
until such information becomes public.28 In predicating lOb-5 liability
on the mere "possession" of material nonpublic information, Texas
Gui/Sulphur deviated from the line of common law cases which held
that there was no duty to disclose inside information outside of the
corporate official-shareholder trading context.29
The Supreme Court first considered the extent to which rule lOb-5
proscribed insider trading in Chiarella v. United States.3 In Chiarella,
the Court reversed the conviction of a printer's employee who reaped
great profits in the stock market after deducing the secret identities of
corporate takeover targets from documents he was printing.3' The
Court, citing Cady, Roberts, held that a duty to disclose nonpublic in-
formation prior to trading vests only in those standing in a fiduciary
relationship to shareholders. 32 The Court concluded that Chiarella in-
cuffed no duty to disclose information before trading because, unlike a
corporate official who must act in accordance with his fiduciary duty to
shareholders, Chiarella was a "complete stranger" who happened to
acquire otherwise nonpublic information.33
Although the Court in Chiarella narrowed the scope of lOb-5, 34 it
27. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
28. Id at 848. Corporate officials, acting on inside information that Texas Gulf Sulphur
(TGS) had struck a large ore deposit in Canada, purchased large quantities of TGS stock and call
options. Id at 843-47. The Second Circuit, holding that rule lOb-5 imposed a duty to disclose or
abstain from trading, enjoined the officers from further trading and subsequently ordered them to
return their illegally acquired profits. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
29. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. Facially, Texas Guf Sulphur does not
appear to go beyond Cady, Roberts. The SEC in Cady, Roberts, however, while advocating the
equal access theory, did not rule on the doctrine's applicability to a non-fiduciary. See supra note
26. The Texas GuIfSulphur court, in contrast, explicitly stated that anyone possessing material
nonpublic information had a duty to disclose or refrain from trading. 401 F.2d at 848.
30. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
31. Id at 224. The defendant purchased shares of the target companys' stock before public
announcement of the bids. Id Once the information was public, the shares naturally increased in
value, netting Chiarella a $30,000 gain. Id The district court convicted Chiarella of a criminal
violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (providing for
criminal penalties for willful violations of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act). The Second Circuit,
relying on Texas GulfSulphur, affirmed his conviction. 558 F.2d 1358, 1373 (2d Cir. 1978).
32. 445 U.S. at 231-33. The Supreme Court flatly rejected the assertion that a duty to dis-
close arises absent a fiduciary duty merely because one possesses material nonpublic information.
Id at 233. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
33. 445 U.S. at 232-33.
34. Chiarellds narrowing of rule lOb-5 in the context of insider trading parallels the Court's
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failed to address explicitly whether "tippees" of corporate insiders are
among those required to disclose before trading. The Court stated,
however, that a tippee had a duty to disclose if he served as "a partici-
pant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."35
Dirks v. SEC36 presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
settle finally the issue of when a corporate insider's duty to disclose
extends to corporate tippees. By a six to three37 vote the Court held
that a tippee derivatively acquires a duty of disclosure from the fiduci-
ary duty an insider-tipper owes corporate shareholders. 38  If the in-
sider's purpose for tipping is not to secure personal gain, he does not
breach his fiduciary duty and the tippee does not breach his derivative
duty by trading.39
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began by reaffirming
restriction of the scope of lOb-5 in other areas. Cf. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 642
(1977) (narrowing the coverage of the lob-5 requirement of manipulation and deception); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hoclfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (establishing a scienter requirement); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (establishing a "standing" requirement that the plain-
tiff must be a buyer or seller of the security in question). For a more in-depth discussion of the
trend noted above, see Long, Treble Damagesfor Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A
SuggestedAnalysis andApplication ofthe RICO Civil Cause ofAction, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 201-
05 (1981).
35. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (1980). One commentator prophesied that "in light of the emphasis
in the Chiarella footnote on a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider, if the insider has a legitimate
business purpose in communicating the information, there [is] no fraudulent misconduct punish-
able under rule lOb-5." Langevoort, supra note 12, at 27. Langevoort's prediction was correct.
See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). See also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
For support, the Chiarella Court cited Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). In Shapiro, Merrill Lynch, a prospective underwriter for Douglas Air-
craft Company debentures, tipped several of its favored clients that Douglas Aircraft Company
would soon report sharply lower earnings. Id at 231-32. The tippees were able to sell their
Douglas shares before the decline in earnings became public and before Douglas shares plum-
meted in value in response to the news. Id 'at 232-33. The Second Circuit, citing Texas Gupf
Sulphur, held that tippees are subject to the same duty as insider-tippers to disclose or abstain
from trading. Id at 237.
The Shapiro court grounded its decision heavily on the broad "possession" theory which the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Chiarella. 445 U.S. at 231. See supra notes 32-33 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, although the Court in Chiarella cited Shapiro in reference to tippee
liability, Shapiro is clearly weak precedent.
36. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
37. Justice Powell wrote for the majority in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
39. Id at 3265-66. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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Chiarella,4 ° and rejecting the notion that tippees acquire a duty to dis-
close whenever they obtain inside information.4' The court cautioned,
however, that tippees are not always free to trade on nonpublic infor-
mation.42 For instance, because tippees acquire a derivative fiduciary
duty from their corporate tippers,43 fiduciaries and tippees cannot act in
tandem to allow the fiduciary indirectly to achieve unlawful objectives
he could not lawfully reach directly.44 Justice Powell, citing
Chiarella,4 thus concluded that a tippee assumes a derivative fiduciary
duty to disclose only if the insider's tip constitutes a breach of his fidu-
ciary duty to shareholders.46
Justice Powell then turned to a consideration of whether Secrist's tip
to Dirks constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty to EFCA sharehold-
ers.47 Citing Cady, Roberts, Justice Powell noted that one "purpose of
the securities laws was to eliminate the use of inside information for
40. Id at 3261. The Court stated:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where the
person who has traded on inside information 'was not the [corporation's] agent,.. . was
not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed
their trust and confidence.'
Id (citations omitted). See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
41. Id at 3262. The Court reiterated its fear of imposing a general duty on the public to
"forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id at 3261 (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980)). One commentator suggests that the Court's fear stems
from its lack of a solid theory on which to predicate such a general duty. Easterbrook, supra note
24, at 323.
42. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
43. Id
44. Id at 3264. Justice Powell pointed to section 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)
(1982), which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act
or thing which would be unlawful for such person to do under the provisions of this title. . . or
any rule or regulation hereunder through or by means of any other person." Id
45. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n. 12. See supra notes 34-35 and accompany-
ing text.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 3264. The Court reasoned that because a tippee's duty to corporate share-
holders derives from the insider's duty, the tippee has no duty to disclose or refrain from trading
in the absence of such a duty on the part of the insider. Id
Justice Powell qualified this concept, asserting that "under some circumstances" professionals
with a "special confidential relationship" to a corporation may have a direct fiduciary responsibil-
ity to the shareholders, and therefore, an independent duty to disclose. Id at 3261 n.14. Justice
Powell identified underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consultants as persons who might fit
within this category. He asserted that these professionals may incur a duty to disclose when they
legitimately receive nonpublic corporate information that the corporation expected them to keep
confidential. Justice Powell emphasized that under such circumstances a professional "may be
treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee." Id (emphasis added).
47. Id at 3265.
Washington University Open Scholarship
174 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:165
personal advantage. '48 He expressly rejected the notion that equal in-
formation among traders was an important factor in determining
whether an insider breached his fiduciary duty.49 Justice Powell con-
cluded that an insider-tipper breaches his fiduciary duty when, in tip-
ping, he secures a direct or indirect personal gain." Justice Powell
noted that Secrist, the tipper, tipped with the intent to expose the
EFCA fraud, and not for the forbidden purpose of obtaining personal
advantage.51 Absent a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Secrist,
Dirks could not breach his derivative duty. 2
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, accepted the majority's articulation of
the derivative duty concept, 53 but vigorously challenged the majority's
"improper purpose" test. 4 He asserted that Secrist, in tipping Dirks,
ultimately intended to encourage Dirks' institutional clients to sell their
EFCA stock.55  Secrist, whose fiduciary duty prevented him from di-
rectly trading on the basis of the disclosed information, thereby suc-
48. Id (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). The footnote in Cady,
Roberts that the Court cited corresponds to the SEC's discussion of its first requirement for finding
that an individual has a duty to disclose: that the insider has access to corporate information not
intended to accrue to anyone's personal benefit. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The
second prong of the SEC's proposed test, which focuses on the inherent unfairness involved when
such insiders trade with others knowing they are not privy to the same information, demonstrates
that the SEC was as concerned with shareholder harm as with insider gain. See supra note 26.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 3263. In rejecting the "equal information" theory, the Court noted the
method by which corporate information reaches the market. The Court explained that market
analysts often meet with corporate insiders to help form judgments concerning a particular stock's
value. These judgments are then made available to the analyst's clients in market newsletters.
The Court stated that "[it is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets
themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corpora-
tion's stockholders or the public generally." Id The Court did not discuss the less onerous and
more practical requirement of equal access to information. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 3265. The Court thus established a "proper purpose" test. If the insider's
purpose for tipping is not improper, he breaches no fiduciary duty when he discloses the secret
corporate information. The SEC argued that such a test enables insiders to "fabricate some osten-
sibly legitimate business justification for transmitting the information." Id The Court responded
that the test focused on objective criteria such as whether the insider derived "pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id at 3266.
51. Id at 3267-78.
52. Id at 3268. The Court explained that "Dirks therefore could not have been 'a participant
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.'" Id (quoting Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
53. 103 S. Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 3270-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cessfully caused others to divest their interests.56  Thus, Justice
Blackmun argued, Secrist achieved indirectly what he could not law-
fully achieve directly.5 7
Justice Blackmun maintained that the majority incorrectly relied on
Caa; Roberts to characterize the insider's duty as one imposed to pre-
vent personal gain.58 He asserted instead that the duty is based on a
"relationship of trust and confidence," 59 giving the shareholders an as-
surance that the fiduciary will not take actions that will harm them.60
Justice Blackmun contended that Secrist's actions harmed those market
participants who acquired EFCA shares,6 1 and further stressed that Se-
crist's failure to realize personal gain did not "eradicate the sharehold-
ers' injury."62
Justice Blackmun found no precedent for the "improper purpose"
test63 and criticized the majority for adding a "subjective limitation" to
the concept of fiduciary duty.64 Moreover, he charged the majority
with adopting a policy that gave more weight to the "benefits" secured
from the exposure of the Equity Funding fraud than to the harm
56. Id at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that it is undisputed that
Secrist could not directly trade on his inside information. "Unlike the printer in Chiarella, Secrist
stood in a fiduciary relationship with these shareholders. As the [majority stated] . . . corporate
insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure when trading with shareholders of the corpora-
tion " Id
57. Id at 3269-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that according to the major-
ity's view that tippees cannot enable a fiduciary to reach indirectly an objective he could not
lawfully reach directly, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text, Dirks' actions made him
"liable as a participant in the breach after the fact." Id at 3270. See supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 3271 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that pri-
vate gain was not a requisite element of the Cady, Roberts conception of duty. He maintained that
the prevention of pecuniary gain had nothing to do with the second prong ("inherent unfairness")
of the Cads. Roberts test. Id at 3271 n.9. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. 103 S, Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222. 228 (1980)).
60. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that Secrist's disclosure
to Dirks resulted in a shift of the inevitable, major loss due to the EFCA fraud from Dirks' clients
to the unsuspecting public. Id
62. Id at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. 1d at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun claimed that the majority de-
rived its entire support for its "improper purpose test" from a footnote in Cady, Roberts and a
single comment in a law review article. Id at 3270 n.6.
64. Id at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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caused EFCA shareholders by exposure of the fraud.65
Dirks represents yet another phase of the Supreme Court's narrow-
ing of rule lOb-5.66 Although the Court properly stated the derivative
duty concept,67 its formulation of the "improper purpose" test warrants
critical scrutiny.6 8 The Court derived its entire support for the "im-
proper purpose" test from a footnote in Cady, Roberts, which asserts
that a purpose of the 1934 Act was to eliminate the corporate officer's
use of inside information for personal advantage. 69 The Court appears
to have ignored subsequent discussion in Cady, Roberts identifying a
legislative intent to protect the investing public. 70 The Court's new in-
quiry into motive adds a subjective component to rule lOb-5, grossly
overcomplicating the SEC's already difficult enforcement duties.7t
While the Court correctly rejected, from both a practical and legal
standpoint, any need for equal information among traders, 72 it failed to
distinguish the fundamentally different Cady, Roberts concept of equal
access to information.73 An equal access requirement develops from
the view that it is inherently unfair for an individual to trade on infor-
mation he knows is unavailable to the general public. 74 Such a require-
ment would not affect a situation in which certain information is open
to all investors, but only if they know the proper source.75
65. Id at 3272-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun characterized the majority's
approach as using the end to justify the means. Id
66. See supra note 34.
67. See supra notes 38 & 41-44 and accompanying texts.
68. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 48 & 58-62 and accompanying texts.
70. See supra notes 25-26 & 48 and accompanying texts. The SEC in Cady, Roberts most
likely did not intend to impart the significance to its footnote that the Dirks majority attaches to it.
If the SEC had, it certainly would have found for Cady, Roberts & Co. as the tip in question came
from an insider who had nothing to gain from tipping. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. The Chiarella test was much simpler to administer. Under Chlarella, the SEC only
needed to establish three clear elements to find a duty to disclose and a breach thereof. The
"insider" had to be a corporate fiduciary, in possession of material, nonpublic information, who
failed-to disclose prior to trading. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text. The Court's new motive inquiry requires the SEC to ascertain
whether an insider is disingenuous in his assertion of legitimate business purpose. See supra note
50.
72. See supra notes 26 & 41 and accompanying texts.
73. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
74. Id
75. Id In fact, an equal access requirement fits in well with the majority's conception of how
market information reaches the public. Seesupranote 49. If analysts make their judgments avail-
able in newsletters to their clients, then technically anyone can acquire the same information if
they know where to look or with whom to speak.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss1/5
TIPPEE LIABILITY
The Supreme Court, in applauding Dirks' role in the exposure of
EFCA's massive fraud,76 failed to give sufficient weight to the manipu-
lative aspect of Dirks' actions.77 Dirks clearly acted in the best interest
of a few powerful clients, causing the shift of an inevitable multimillion
dollar loss from certain large firms to an unsuspecting public.7 8 In rec-
ognizing the importance of encouraging corporate officers to reveal evi-
dence of corporate mismanagement to the public, the Court has
paradoxically set a precedent for future manipulative activities.79
The Court, however, deserves praise for expanding that category of
individuals who have a direct fiduciary duty to a corporation.80 The
Court draws a line, albeit a fine one, between those professional "out-
siders" whose "special relationship" to the corporate decisionmaking
process makes them privy to inside information, and those whose rela-
tionship with the corporation makes them dependent on others to se-
cure such data.8' In placing a direct fiduciary duty to disclose on the
former group of outsiders, the Court recognized the special place such
persons occupy in the corporate machine and their corresponding ac-
cess to the most sensitive corporate secrets.8 2
The clear losers of the Dirks decision are the SEC and the public.
The Court's shift of focus from protecting the investing public to the
relatively less critical matter of preventing insiders' personal gain83 lim-
its the effectiveness of rule lOb-5 as a means of preventing fraudulent
conduct in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The
Court itself acknowledges that it may prove difficult to determine an
insider's motive.8 4 Congress should act to remedy the unacceptable ad-
vantage which Dirks gives to corporate insiders, their tippees, and their
76. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
77, See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. Id
79. Now a tipper and a trading tippee can avoid all liability by simply "fabricating" a proper
purpose. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The Court gave little attention to the
argument that its decision provides the investing public almost no protection. 103 S. Ct. at 3267
n.27.
80. See supra note 46. This expansion is contrary to the limiting approach of the remainder
of the opinion. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 46.
82. The Dirks majority followed the directive pronounced in Cady, Roberts requiring scru-
tiny of the actions of those who have access to secret corporate information intended only to fulfill
a corporate purpose. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
84. 103 S. Ct. at 3266 (1983).
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powerful clients at the expense of the investing public. The decision
clearly opens the door for the very type of manipulative practices that
Congress found to undermine confidence in the nation's securities
market.85
.. D.M
85. See supra note 15.
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